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LABOR LAW AND ANTITRUST: "SO DECEPTIVE AND
OPAQUE ARE THE ELEMENTS OF THESE PROBLEMS"*
A review of the scope of the labor exemption to the antitrust
laws and an explication of how its limits remain undefined by
the divergent opinions of the Justices of the Supreme Court in
Jewel Tea and Pennington. Emphasis is placed on the evidentiary
problems that result from the divergence.
SINCE the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890,1 a perennial debate
has raged over the proper application of the antitrust laws to the
labor movement. Although the unions had long opted for an ab-
solute right of employees to organize and pursue their mutual bene-
fit,2 at an early date such activity was held subject to antitrust stric-
tures on the theory that the act did not contemplate discrimination
between sources of restraint on trade.3 In time, however, Congress
determined that labor was to be at least partially protected from
the effects of the Sherman Act,4 and today sections six and twenty
Local 309, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 478 (1950).
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
. . . declared to be illegal." Sherman Act § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
2 Cf. CHAMBERLAIN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 23-47 (1951). The unions also asserted
that the Sherman Act was intended primarily to apply to business combinations and
thus that it should not be extended to the dissimilar labor field without a specific
congressional mandate. See BERMAN, LABOR AND THE SHERMAN ACT 1-30 (1930) [here-
inafter cited as BERMIAN]; see also 21 CONG. REc. 2461-67 (1890). However, the govern-
ment generally resisted this argument in antitrust prosecutions. See Miller, Antitrust
Labor Problems: Law and Policy, 7 LAw S: CONTEMP. PRoB. 82-84 (1940). See also
Winter, Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Application of Antitrust Stan-
dards to Union Activities, 73 YALE L.J. 14, 30-32 (1963). See generally Allen Bradley
Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797, 802 & n.3 (1945), for a comprehensive list of the
relevant congressional material.
3E.g., Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908); United States v. Debs, 64 Fed. 724
(C.C.N.D. Ill. 1894); United States v. Amalgamated Council, 54 Fed. 994 (C.C.E.D.
La. 1893). See also BERMAN 284-325, for a collation of the earlier cases. While it could
be argued that ordinary union activity necessarily tends to restrain trade, it was
never argued that unions themselves, as distinguished from their activities, were
per se illegal. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 438-39 (1911).
See also Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 202 Fed. 512 (N.D.W. Va. 1912), rev'd,
214 Fed. 685 (4th Cir. 1914), rev'd, 245 U.S. 229 (1917).
'The Clayton Act §§ 6, 20, 88 Stat. 731, 738 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1964), 29 U.S.C.
§ 52 (1964), provided the first exemption of labor from the antitrust laws. The legisla-
tive history of this new law was unclear. See FRANKFURTER &- GREENE, THE LABOR IN-
JUNCTION 141-45 (1930) [hereinafter cited as FRANKFURTER & GREENE]. However, the courts
soon determined that the stated exemption was applicable only to transactions involving
unions and employees directly parties to a given labor dispute. See, e.g., Duplex Print-
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of the Clayton Act 5 coupled with sections four and thirteen of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act0 are interpreted as providing that specified
types of union activity undertaken in the course of a labor dispute
are to be exempt from prosecution under the federal antitrust
laws. When confronted with questions arising under these sections
the courts have found the labor exemption and the Sherman Act
difficult to reconcile.7 Efforts to harmonize these clashing policies
have precipitated holdings that union activity which arguably
falls within the exemption may lose its protected character where
the union has combined with non-labor groups.8 However, since
ing Press Co. v. Dearing, 254 U.S. 443 (1921), discussed in FRANKFURTER & GREENE
166-70. For a parallel account see Winter, supra note 2, at 33-34. Thus, in the
Duplex case the Clayton exemption was extended only to defendants directly in the
employ of a plaintiff corporation. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Dearing, supra at
472-74. This distinction between primary and secondary activity seems to have orig.
inated in Loewe v. Lawlor, supra note 3. Since § 16 of the act also authorized
injunctive relief on private motion, incorporation of the primary-secondary distinction
into the Clayton Act served to further harass union organization attempts. 38 Stat.
737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 27 (1964). See Winter, supra note 2, at 34. Injunctive relief was
not available to employers under the Sherman Act. WiTrE, THE GOVERNMENT IN LABOR
DIsPUTEs 131 (1932). Sections 4 and 13 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act abolished the
primary-secondary dichotomy insofar as private remedies available under the Clayton
Act were concerned, and in United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1940), this
exemption was extended to criminal penalties under the Sherman Act on the grounds
that to do otherwise would be inconsistent with congressional purpose. See also
Goldberg, Unions and the Antitrust Laws, 7 LAB. L.J. 178, 184-86 (1956).
""The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing
contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and opera.
tion of labor . . .organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help . . .or
to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying
out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organization, or the members thereof,
be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade
under the antitrust laws." Clayton Act § 6, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1964).
"No restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of the United
States ... in any case between employer and employees ... growing out of a dispute
concerning terms and conditions of employment .... Clayton Act § 20, 38 Stat. 738
(1914), 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1964).
6 47 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 104, 113 (1964). This legislation has
been held to represent an expansion and clarification of the aims of the Clayton
Act. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797, 806 (1945); United States v,
Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 231 (1940).
7 "The result of all this is that we have two declared congressional policies which
it is our responsibility to try to reconcile. The one seeks to preserve a competitive
business economy; the other to preserve the rights of labor to organize to better its
conditions through the agency of collective bargaining." Allen Bradley Co. v.
Local 3, IBEW, supra note 6, at 806.
8 E.g., UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Local 189, Amalgamated Meat
Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965); Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW,
supra note 6. In the latter case, it was found that the exemption had been vitiated
by the union's combination with several employer associations. The court noted that
"the union's contribution to the trade boycott was accomplished through threats
that unless their employers bought their goods from local manufacturers the union
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the theoretical basis for this limitation is uncertain the exact scope
of the exemption remains vague.
The limits of the labor exemption were recently at issue before
the Supreme Court in UMW v. Pennington9 and Local 189, A mal-
gamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co.,'0 and the divergence of
opinion in these cases again illustrated the unsettled status of
labor unions vis-a-vis the antitrust laws. Moreover, in the course of
the opinions a substantial disagreement among the Justices was
manifested as to the proper use of circumstantial evidence of the
existence of a prohibited combination.:1 The following review of
Jewel Tea and Pennington is designed to focus on both of these
interrelated questions, and will undertake to divine the ramifica-
tions of the divergent views enunciated by the various Justices.
PRIOR TREATMENT OF THE LABOR EXEMPTION
The labor exemption was framed in its present statutory form
by the Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932.12 Although it was arguable
that the passage of this act and the complementary Wagner Act's
indicated a congressional intent to deprive the federal courts of the
power to affect national labor policy,14 the Supreme Court in Apex
laborers would terminate the 'relationship of employment' and cease to perform 'work
or labor' for them; and through their 'recommending, advising or persuading others
by peaceful and lawful means' not to 'patronize' sellers of the boycott or electrical
equipment." Id. at 807.
S381 U.S. 657 (1965).
10 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
12 There was no opinion of the Court in Jewel Tea. Mr. Justice White, joined by the
Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Brennan wrote one opinion supporting reversal, id. at
679-97, while Mr. Justice Goldberg joined Justices Harlan and Stewart in urging re-
versal. Id. at 726-35. Mr. Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion was concurred in by
Justices Black and Clark. Id. at 735-38.
Mr. Justice White's opinion is labelled the opinion of the Court in Pennington. 381
U.S. at 659-72. However, Mr. Justice Douglas wrote a concurring opinion for Justices
Black and Clark. Id. at 672-75. Mr. Justice Goldberg, representing Justices Harlan
and Stewart, concurred in the reversal in Pennington, but dissented from the opinion
of the Court. Id. at 697-725.
12 Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1964),
contained substantially the same provisions as the Clayton Act, and seems to have
been designed to erase the court-created primary-secondary dichotomy. See note 4
supra.
13 National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-67
(1964).
14 The two statutes, when read together, may be interpreted as enunciating a general
intent to establish a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme for labor relations.
It has been argued that since the judicially administered antitrust laws may be utilized
to thwart the institution of collective bargaining protected by the labor acts, the
regulatory scheme contemplated by Congress could best be effectuated by with.
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Hosiery Co. v. Leader15 indicated that a violation of the antitrust
laws would be found where a union engaged in conduct which had
or was intended to have an appreciable effect upon the price or sup-
ply of goods in interstate commerce."0 Subsequently, in United
States v. Hutcheson,7 the Court seemingly shifted its focus from the
effect of union activity on the market to the nature of the activity
itself, and noted that under the exemption provided by section 20
of the Clayton Act:
So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine
with non-labor groups, the licit and the illicit... are not to be
distinguished by any judgment regarding the wisdom or unwis-
dom, the rightness or wrongness, the selfishness or unselfishness
of the end of which the particular union activities are the means.' 8
This statement, while perhaps indicative of a policy shift, left
several questions unanswered. For instance, in the following term
the Court indicated that no exemption would be accorded where the
matter before it could not be characterized as a "labor dispute."''
Thus, an obvious question arose as to whether the "licit and illicit"
nature of union activity could be examined and utilized as a criterion
for the purpose of determining whether the matters at issue actually
involved a labor dispute.20 Moreover, granting the existence of a
holding the conduct of labor regulation from the jurisdiction of the courts. For gen-
eral background in this area see FRANKFURTER & GREENE 231-78. See also WiTrT,
op. cit. supra note 4, at 131.
Is 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
10 Mr. Justice Stone concerned himself primarily with the question of whether an
actual violation of the Sherman Act had occurred, and thus did not specifically consider
the nature and extent of the exemption itself. It may be argued that in light of sub-
sequent opinions the Apex court actually considered only the question of whether it
had jurisdiction of the suit under the antitrust laws, and thus that no authoritative
pronouncement was made concerning actual union liability.
1 312 U.S. 219 "(1941).
Is Id. at 232. Even though an argument could be made for complete immunity, the
Court apparently thought that it would be too dramatic a policy reversal to offer
labor a blanket exemption. Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 56-57 (1941) (Stone, J.,
dissenting). See also Miller, Antitrust Labor Problems: Law and Policy, 7 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 82 (1940), for a pre-Hutcheson discussion of the same problem.
19 United States v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143 (1942).2 0 This question was discussed in the opposing briefs in Allen Bradley Co. v.
Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945). The defendant union contended that a labor
organization must both combine with non-labor groups and cease to act in its own
self-interest to fall without the exemption. Brief for Respondent pp. 34-35. The
plaintiff, on the other hand, argued that the existence of a combination is irrelevant
and unnecessary so long as the union pursued a "non-labor" objective, Brief for Pe-
titioner, p. 27, since the presence of such an objective would be inconsistent with the
existence of a labor dispute. Id. at 18-25. Ironically, although this argument was
rejected, the plaintiff won its case.
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labor dispute in a particular case, unanswered questions were raised
by the requirement that a union must pursue its "self-interest"
in order to fall within the exemption. For instance, although a
union presumably always acts to further its own interest, it was sug-
gested that the exemption might be vitiated where union activity
benefits non-labor groups as well as the union membership.2 1
The Supreme Court remained notably unhelpful in resolving
these issues22 until they were squarely presented in Allen Bradley
Co. v. Local 3, IBEW.23 In Allen Bradley, the union instituted a
drive to organize the employees of most of the electrical equipment
manufacturers and contractors in the New York area. In the course
of this drive a series of agreements was negotiated whereby the
contractors agreed to deal only with those manufacturers organized
by the union, and the manufacturers in turn agreed to follow a
similar procedure with regard to contractors. The resultant insu-
lation from competition allowed the manufacturers to raise prices
and the contractors to fix bids, ultimately resulting in higher wages
and shorter hours for Local 3's membership.24 The Supreme Court
2" See 29 CALim. L. REv. 399, 408 (1941).
22Following Hutcheson, the Court confined itself to rendering memorandum
opinions on these matters. See United States v. International Hod Carrier's Council,
313 U.S. 539 (1941) (per curiam) (antitrust prosecution dismissed where union at-
tempted to force employers to refrain from using labor saving devices); United States
v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 318 U.S. 741 (1941) (per curiam) (antitrust prose-
cution dismissed where union, with cooperation of employers, attempted to eliminate
recordings and music of non-union artists from the air waves).
325 U.S. 797 (1945).
The defendant union was a member of the New York Building Trades Council,
an affiliation that included some 120 local unions engaged in the building and con-
struction industries. This Council had, prior to the events at issue, established pro-
cedures whereby any of its constituents could serve notice of injury caused by the
unfair labor practice of any of the local building contractors and could in extreme
cases call all of the members of the affiliated unions out on strike. In 1934 the defendant
union sought to replenish its declining membership by organizing the employees of a
group of local electrical equipment manufacturers. These manufacturers were in
precarious financial positions and consequently paid wages substantially below the
scale which the union habitually requested. However, the organization attempt
was completely successful and the newly organized manufacturers substantially in-
creased their wage scales. This increase was made possible by further actions of the
union. Pursuant to the Building Council's procedures, the union had declared all
producers of electrical equipment other than those local manufacturers organized
by itself to be "unfair." This action placed any local building contractors dealing
with other equipment manufacturers under the threat of immediate and serious
strike. As a result the local manufacturers found themselves virtually without com-
petition and able to raise prices to levels which would more than finance wage in-
creases.
This arrangement was in turn made more palatable to the local building con-
tractors by the establishment of an association of contractors and union representatives
Vol. 1966: 191]
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held that although the union was acting in its own economic self-
interest, this activity nonetheless fell without the purview of the
labor exemption to the antitrust laws.25
Although the exact basis of this holding is unclear, the decision
did purport to resolve some of the ambiguities presented by
Hutcheson. The Allen Bradley Company had argued that Local 3
was not entitled to an exemption under the Norris-LaGuardia Act
because that union's unlawful intent had carried its conduct out
of the context of a labor dispute.2 6 The Court, however, specifically
which enforced a "Voluntary Code" governing bid procedures. The code, originally
incorporated in various union-contractor collective bargaining agreements, provided
that all bids for work within New York City had to be submitted in advance to a
code committee for approval. Any bid ten per cent or more below the average of other
bids for a particular job was to be investigated to determine whether an intent to
engage in price cutting was involved. Substantial fines could be levied if such an
intent were found. The contractors, of course, benefited from this arrangement in
that it served as a vehicle to insulate them from any substantial competition among
themselves. They also benefited from any increase in manufacturer prices, since the
conventions adopted by the code committee required that members were to compute
"commissions" on individual jobs by taking a percentage of the cost of materials.
The above statement of facts is derived substantially from the opinion of the
lower court. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 41 F. Supp. 727, 731-33 (S.D.N.Y.
1941), rev'd, 145 F.2d 215 (1944), rev'd, 325 U.S. 797 (1945). For the final disposition
of the case at that level see 51 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
2r 325 U.S. at 809.
21 See discussion note 20 supra. This point is crucial when it is noted that by its
terms the Norris-LaGuardia exemption obtains only when a given altercation can be
characterized as a "labor dispute." Norris-LaGuardia Act § 1, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29
U.S.C. § 101 (1964). Further, the Supreme Court by interpretation has indicated
that such characterization may be made only when the dispute at issue arises some-
where within the matrix of a general employer-employee controversy. Thus, in
Columbia River Packers v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143 (1942), a dispute between a processor
of fish and an organization of fishermen was held to be not a labor dispute and not
within the labor exemption, since the fishermen could be more readily termed inde-
pendent contractors than employees. On the other hand, in Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959), a union-management contract clause speci-
fying minimum truck rentals to be paid third-party independent contractors was
held to be sufficiently related to a labor dispute to be exempted from prosecution
under state antitrust laws.
While Hinton may be rationalized by the statement that no labor dispute existed
because no party to the controversy could be termed an employee, other cases indicate
that not all actions of bona fide employees automatically fall within the exemption.
For instance, in Los Angeles Meat & Provision Drivers v. United States, 371 U.S. 94
(1962), the union persuaded four self-employed grease peddlers to join in order that
between them they might control the flow of waste grease from California restaurants
to overseas purchasers. The Court held that such activity was without the labor
exemption since there was found "no job or wage competition or economic inter-
relationship of any kind between the grease peddlers and other members of the
... union." Id. at 103. Since strictly speaking the peddlers and the union were related
economically through their common interest in the product market, the Court was
obviously speaking to the fact that such relationship could in no way be termed "em-
ployment-related." Further, it would appear that the labor exemption has been
[Vol. 1966: 191
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found a labor dispute present 27 and considered only the extent of
protection afforded the activity at issue. Moreover, by terming
irrelevant the lower court's finding that the union acted in its own
economic self-interest, the Court apparently indicated that in
the presence of a combination it was willing to make distinc-
tions between the types of objectives which might be charac-
terized as "protected" under the Hutcheson rubric of "self-in-
terest.128 On the other hand the Court also reaffirmed the Hutcheson
view that a combination with non-labor groups was a necessary
prerequisite to loss of the exemption, expressly noting that the
union might have escaped antitrust liability had it negotiated its
agreements with each individual employer rather than with employer
groups.29
withdrawn in these situations even where the union refrains from combining with
non-union groups, but rather acts through an agency of its own to accomplish ob-
jectives unrelated to an employment-based controversy. See Streiffer v. Seafarers Sea
Chest Corp., 162 F. Supp. 602 (E.D. La. 1958). Further, some cases indicate that
union attempts to control an employer's exercise of management prerogatives also
will not be considered to arise out of a labor dispute. Opera on Tour, Inc. v. Weber,
285 N.Y. 348, 34 N.E.2d 349 (1941). See Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co.,
(opinion of White, J.), indicating that the scope of permissible union demands is to
be determined by a process of weighing the adverse effect on competition against the
directness of the union's interest. See also Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago &
N'wn Ry., 362 U.S. 330 (1960).
27 325 U.S. at 807 n.12. "It has been argued that no labor disputes existed. The
argument is untenable. We do not have here, as we did in Columbia River Packers
Ass'n v. Hinton,... a dispute between groups of businessmen revolving solely around
the price at which one group would sell commodities to another group. On the con-
trary, Local 3 is a labor union and its spur to action related to wages and working
conditions." Ibid.
8 However, it is of course also possible to argue that the Allen Bradley holding
was not intended to be read into the general structure established by Hutcheson,
and thus that the case is a kind of sport that should be strictly limited to its facts.
As an historical matter such an approach appears especially relevant in view of lan-
guage in the opinion which seemed to indicate that the Court employed no general
theory as a basis for its holding, but rather looked only at the particular anamoly
which would be created if it held otherwise. See note 30 infra.
2 325 U.S. at 807, 810. The Court noted that "aside from the fact that the labor
union here acted in combination with the contractors and manufacturers, the means
that it adopted to contribute to the combination's purpose fall squarely within the
'specified acts' declared by § 20 [of the Clayton Act] not to be violations of federal
law . . . . Consequently, under our holdings in the Hutcheson case and other cases
which followed it, had there been no union-contractor-manufacturer combination
the union's actions here, coming as they did within the exemptions of the Clayton
and Norris-LaGuardia Acts, would not have been violations of the Sherman Act."
Id. at 807. (Emphasis added.) Subsequently the Court reiterated its stand and ex-
pressly stated that "our holding means that the same labor union activities may or
may not be in violation of the Sherman Act, dependent upon whether the union
acts alone or in combination with non-labor groups." Id. at 810.
The approbation of parallel as opposed to multi-employer bargaining seems also to
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The chief interpretive problems posed by Allen Bradley have
centered around the effort to establish an adequate theoretical basis
for distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate combina-
tions. This effort has in turn been hampered by the variety of fac-
tors adumbrated by the Court in the course of its opinion. The
Court repeatedly observed that Congress could not have intended
that a combination of employers in violation of the Sherman Act
could be insulated from antitrust prosecution merely by the partici-
pation of a labor union.30 This emphasis would seem to be rather
be supported by Hunt v. Crumboch, 525 U.S. 821 (1945), a companion case to Allen
Bradley. In Crumboch, the union, because of labor difficulties with an interstate
carrier, refused to allow that carrier's employees to join the union and simultaneously
negotiated an agreement with A & P, the carrier's primary customer, which restricted
A & P exclusively to truckers with union shop arrangements. The Court held that
these union activities were within the labor exemption on the grounds that, inter alia,
there was no combination of the union with non-labor groups. Thus the case was
viewed as falling squarely within the Hutcheson rule. In view of the union's agree-
ment with A & P, it is probably incorrect to state that no combination with non-labor
groups existed; rather, the union had engaged in no relevant combinations. Although
the precise standards of relevance are unclear, it is obvious in Crumboch that the
contracting non-labor group received no competitive advantage from the extinction
of its trucker, and it might be argued that this is the distinguishing feature of the case.
The importance of the "self-interest" rubric has been revivified by Republic
Prod., Inc. v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 245 F. Supp. 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), which
construed the Pennington and Jewel Tea decisions as pointing "to the union's self-
interest as the supreme test of antitrust immunity." Id. at 481. The plaintiff-employer
argued that the union's conduct was not exempt under Pennington since that case
held that the exemption of § 20 of the Clayton Act and § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act did not control cases in which there was a union-employer agreement. The agree-
ment by which plaintiff attempted to negate the immunity of the labor exemption
was the collective bargaining agreement itself. Id. at 480. The court rejected this argu-
ment pointing out that this agreement, standing alone, is insufficient to vitiate the
exemption. Evidence that the union conspired with one group of producers to injure
another was essential to the exemption vitiation in Pennington. Ibid. See also 34
FoRDHttA L. REv. 286, 295-97 (1965), which maintains that the "conspiracy" must be
shown by reference to an agreement independent of the collective bargaining contract.
But what evidence would be admissible to establish such an "independent agreement"?
See text accompanying notes 88-110 infra.
30 "There is . . . one line which we can draw with assurance that we follow the
congressional purpose. We know that Congress feared the concentrated power of
business organizations to dominate markets and prices. It intended to outlaw business
monopolies. A business monopoly is no less such because a union participates, and
such participation is a violation of the Act." 325 U.S. at 811.
The Court also noted that although it had previously held that combinations of
labor unions, and businessmen were in violation of the act, see Local 167, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 291 U.S. 298 (1934), and United States v. Brims, 272 U.S.
549 (1926), those cases were not persuasive since at the time of their decision the
Court's attention was not sharply focused on the "crucial questions" presented in
Allen Bradley. 325 U.S. at 807-08. This cryptic statement indicates an intent to
retreat somewhat from the Court's previous position, which had tended to lay
special emphasis on the impact of union activity on the product and geographic
markets. See United States v. Brims, supra at 552. This retreat was especially apparent
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unusual in view of the fact that only the union was being prosecuted
in the particular action before the Court, and the courts have shown
little inclination to limit Allen Bradley to this narrow interpre-
tation.31
The interpretive problem is further complicated by the fact
that the Allen Bradley Court was somewhat misleading in its state-
ment of the facts. The Court speaks of the union as "aiding and
abetting" the conspiracy32 when in fact the union would be more
accurately characterized as a prime mover than a mere assistant.
8
Thus, one who felt constrained to read the case narrowly might
argue that given the Court's enunciation of the union's role, the
exemption was to be lost only where the union was being employed
as a "tool" of management. 34 In light of the actual facts, however,
it is arguable that a broader reading of the opinion was justified.
in Allen Bradley when the Court noted that regardless of the effect on the product
and geographic markets the actions of Local 3 would fall within the exemption so
long as the union did not combine with non-labor groups. 325 U.S. at 809. Pre-
sumably this statement may be interpreted to mean that the union might have
lawfully achieved the same ends by using conventional economic pressures and
negotiating parallel agreements with each contractor individually. See Meltzer, Labor
Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U. Cm. L. Rv. 659, 671
(1965).
31In United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186 (1954), and its
companion case, United States v. Employing Lathers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 198 (1954), trade
unions were allegedly involved in a combination with business groups. The Court
held it was error to have dismissed the civil Sherman Act action on grounds that the
government had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. No special
allegation of an employer combination already in violation of the antitrust laws was
required. See also United Bhd. of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395 (1947).
32325 U.S. at 801. See id. at 820-21 (dissenting opinion).
38 The findings of the district court, undisputed by either the court of appeals or the
Supreme Court, stated: "It appears clearly . . . that ... the local manufacturers were
forced by the 'economic powers' of the local union to consent to the signing up
of all their employees by the defendant local, obviously in consideration of their
obtaining the exclusive market for their products in the metropolitan area, and the
barring from the metropolitan area of all similar products made by others." Allen
Bradley v. Local 3, IBEW, 41 F. Supp. 727, 732 (S.D.N.Y. 1941), rev'd, 145 F.2d 215
(1944), rev'd, 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
" "And if it [the union] did [participate], benefits to organized labor cannot be
utilized as a cat's paw to pull employer's chestnuts out of the antitrust fires." United
States v. Woman's Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 386 U.S. 460, 464 (1949) (citing Allen
Bradley). For an example of a case in which the FTC apparently was influenced by
whether the union was acting as an instrumentality of management or its own mem-
bership, see California Sportswear & Dress Ass'n, 54 F.T.C. 835, 89a (1957). The em-
ployment of this kind of a test, of course, is predicated as much on Hutcheson as on
Allen Bradley, and thus involves the problem of the essential ambiguity of the "self-
interest" test. However, the Commission also indicated that it would look to whether
competition had in fact been stifled by the union-employer arrangements. Ibid. This
additional criterion would seem to imply that the Commission itself was not satisfied
with the Hutcheson rule. Further, the new requirement of competitive effect may
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Some courts have interpreted Allen Bradley as broadly encom-
passing the rule that a union falls outside of the labor exemption
whenever it combines with management to fix prices and allo-
cate markets.35 This interpretation also may be justified by
reference to the language of the opinion, since the Court frequently
adverted to this aspect of the union's activities.3 6 Finally, it has
been maintained that Allen Bradley may properly be read to stand
for the proposition that any union-employer group combination is
without the exemption where such combination is designed
to allocate to the employer some benefits characteristic of a monop-
oly.37 However, this interpretation would achieve an identical
result regardless of the organization of a union's undertaking, and
this in turn would seem to run directly counter to the Allen Bradley
Court's implication that identical union activities with the same
basic objectives may be protected when pursued alone but unpro-
tected when pursued in conjunction with multi-employer bargaining
units. 38
RECENT DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT-PENNINGTON:
"There is a Limit as to What Can Be Offered or Extracted
in the Name of Wages"
The vagaries of the Allen Bradley doctrine formed the context
of the recent decisions in UMW v. Pennington and Amalgamated
Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co. The antitrust issue in Pennington
also be grounds for reading California Sportswear as interpreting Allen Bradley as
outlawing union-employer agreements where the employer realizes monopoly benefits.
See discussion note 38 infra and accompanying text.
Or This interpretation is favored at least in part by Mr. Justice Goldberg. See Jewel
Tea Co., 381 U.S. at 728-29. Further, practically every labor antitrust prosecution
involves either price-fixing or market allocation. E.g., United Bhd. of Carpenters
v. United States, 330 U.S. 395 (1947) (cause of action stated when it was alleged that
union had contracted to help management association establish a local monopoly
in return for higher wages); Local 175, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. United States,
219 F.2d 431 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 917 (1955) (union aided electrical con-
tractors in establishing enforcement procedures for rigged bids); Las Vegas Merchant
Plumbers Ass'n v. United States, 210 F.2d 732 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 817
(1954) (union aided plumbing contractors in establishing enforcement procedures
for rigged bids).
36 325 U.S. at 808-09.
37 In the ordinary case this test would have substantially the same effect as the
"price fixing and market allocation" approach. See cases cited note 35 supra.
" As proposed by Meltzer, this test would look only to the economic effects of a
union's activity, and thus a union which negotiated identical parallel agreements
with individual employers would be treated in exactly the same way for labor ex-
emption purposes as one which negotiated a single contract with a single multi-
employer bargaining unit. See Meltzer, supra note 30, at 734. Thus Professor Meltzer
is compelled by the interior logic of his position to view the distinction between
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arose as a cross-claim to the union's suit against a marginal coal
operator for overdue royalty payments owed to an employee wel-
fare and retirement fund.3 9 The essential allegation of the cross-
claim was that the union and the major coal operators had conspired
to drive marginal operators out of business, thereby restraining
trade in the bituminous coal industry. The plaintiff contended
that the conspiracy was primarily effectuated by the use of the 1950
Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement (BCWA),40 which he had signed
in 1952. It contained provisions for wage and welfare fund royalty
payments which were beyond the marginal operator's ability to
meet. The BCWA also barred signator companies from leasing coal
land to firms who failed to comply with the terms of the national
agreement, and a subsequent amendment prohibited the parties
from buying or selling the coal of such companies. 41 The union
embarked on an intensive campaign to impose the terms of the
BCWA on the marginal producers. In addition, the union agreed
parallel individual and multi-employer agreements as a basic defect in the Allen
Bradley opinion.
30 381 U.S. at 659-61. Phillips Brothers Coal Company, under the terms of the
agreement it had signed with the union, was required to pay a forty cent royalty on
each ton of coal mined to the Welfare and Retirement Fund of the UMW. It was
alleged by the trustees of the fund that the company was $55,000 in arrears. Lewis V.
Pennington, 1961 Trade Cas. 78125-33 (E.D. Tenn.), aff'd sub nom. Pennington v. UMW,
325 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
40 Since 1950, the bargaining pattern of the industry has been one which the coal
operators of northern Appalachia have dominated. After a contract is negotiated
with their association, the terms thereof are submitted to corresponding southern and
midwestern associations as well as individual operators. From 74%7, to 79% of the indus-
try operates under uniform terms as a result of this procedure. Raymond 0. Lewis,
144 N.L.R.B. 228, 230-31 (1963).
"'This amendment was promulgated in 1958 and was known as the "Protective
Wage Clause." Id. at 240. The Court stated that it barred the purchase and sale
of coal from "nonunion companies." 381 U.S. at 660. Although the BCWA may have
such an effect in practice, the finding is not literally accurate, since the clause merely
provided "that all bituminious coal . . . procured or acquired by . . . [signator com-
panies] under a subcontract arrangement, shall be or shall have been mined or produced
under terms and conditions which are as favorable to the employees as those provided
for in this Contract." Raymond 0. Lewis, supra note 40, at 240. Hence nonunion
companies adhering to all the terms of the BCWA could transact business with
signatories.
These provisions were the subject of an unfair labor practice proceeding in which
the union was held to have violated § 8 (e) of the National Labor Relations Act.
Id. at 238-39. The NLRB said this section prohibits entering into a contract in
which the employer agrees to cease or refrain from doing business with any other
person unless the contract is "intended to reserve, for the employees within the bar-
gaining unit, work which they have traditionally performed." Id. at 234. The viola-
tion therefore was posited on the finding that the design and intent of these pro-
visions was to "regulate the employment terms and conditions of employees of other
employers with whom the signator employers may do business," rather than preserve
"work for employees covered by the contract." Id. at 237. The union and operators
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to and actively participated in mechanizing the industry, allegedly
to enable the major coal operators to absorb the costs of the increased
wage and welfare fund payments. 42
The BCWA made it impractical for marginal coal operators
to retain major private coal companies as a market for their coal.
The Tennessee Valley Authority markets,4 3 however, provided an
alternative outlet for the marginal operators. It was alleged that
steps were also taken to foreclose these markets. The major com-
panies and the union purportedly succeeded in convincing the Secre-
tary of Labor to exercise his authority under the Walsh-Healy Act44
to impose a high minimum wage on companies competing to supply
T.V.A. under contracts exceeding 10,000 dollars.45 The T.V.A. spot
market for contracts of less than 10,000 dollars was not subject to
the terms of the Walsh-Healy Act,46 but it was allegedly rendered
unprofitable by the sharp decrease in prices that occurred after
two companies in which the union owned a controlling interest
"dumped ' 47 substantial tonnage into this market without regard to
profits.48
were ordered to cease and desist from maintaining, enforcing or giving effect to these
provisions or entering into like provisions. Id. at 239.
'381 U.S. at 660.
There were two "T.V.A. markets." Contracts for over $10,000 constituted the
"term market," whereas those under $10,000 are "spot" orders and are exempt from
the Walsh-Healy Act. Lewis v. Pennington, 1961 Trade Cas. 78125, 78128 (E.D. Tenn.),
aff'd sub nom. Pennington v. UMW, 325 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 381 U.S. 657
(1965).
""That in any contract made and entered into by any executive department,
independent establishment, or other agency . . . of the United States . . . or by any
corporation all the stock of which is beneficially owned by the United States . . .
for the . . . furnishing of materials, [or] supplies ... in any amount exceeding $10,000,
there shall be included the following representations and stipulations:
(b) That all persons employed by the contractor . . . will be paid . . . not less
than the minimum wages as determined by the Secretary of Labor to be the pre-
vailing minimum wages for persons employed on similar work . . . or similar indus.
tries . . . currently operating in the locality in which the materials [and] supplies
... are to be ... furnished under said contract .... " 49 Stat. 2036 (1936), 41 U.S.C.
§ 35 (1964).
"It was alleged that the wage rate imposed was twice as high as the wage rate
determined by the Secretary of Labor in any other industry. Lewis v. Pennington,
1961 Trade Cas. 78125, 78127 (E.D. Tenn.), aff'd sub nom. Pennington v. UMW, 325 F.2d
804 (6th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
4" See notes 43-44 supra.
1 The alleged "dumping" was done by West Kentucky Coal and its subsidiary,
Nashville Coal Company, which were repositories for $25,000,000 of union capital
investments. Lewis v. Pennington, 1961 Trade Cas. 78125, 78128 (E.D. Tenn.), afI'd
sub nom. Pennington v. UMW, 325 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
,"'Lewis v. Pennington, supra note 47, at 78137.
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The Union denied the allegations of conspiracy and maintained
that the negotiation and execution of the BCWA and its subsequent
amendments were exempt from the antitrust laws since these ac-
tivities furthered legitimate labor objectives. 49 The Union rational-
ized the leasing and "boycotting" provisions of the national agree-
ment as protective devices designed to prevent signatories from
evading the terms of the agreement,50 and explained its acquiescence
to mechanization as an acceptance of "an outgrowth, result and
development of American economy in the industry over the years." 51
The district court instructed the jury that it must consider the
BCWA and its amendments as lawful and nonviolative of the Sher-
man Act if they were included at the behest of the union to protect
its wage scale and other benefits and to prevent evasion by the
signatories rather than as a result of a conspiracy between the
union and the major operators. 52 The resulting jury verdict for the
defendant on his cross-claim was affirmed by the court of appeals,
which found a sufficient factual basis for the decision in the cir-
cumstantial evidence of a conspiracy in restraint of trade.53 A
4 Id. at 78129. Moreover, the union maintained that even if there was inter-
ference with the coal production of Phillips Brothers, such a restraint of trade was
insufficient for proscription under the Sherman Act. Id. at 78130. Presumably the
union was relying on Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940). See Winter,
supra note 2, at 55; text accompanying note 15 supra.
10 Lewis v. Pennington, supra note 47, at 78134-36. Since the major operators may
not have enough coal of special quality on hand to meet the demands of their
larger customers they are often forced to buy "supplementary" coal from substandard
producers. The price of this coal is often below the production cost of the major coal
companies, since labor is the main cost factor. Hence these operators may be tempted
to buy substantial amounts of coal as a substitute for production in the majors'
mines. Layoffs in the unionized mines may result from this practice. See Raymond 0.
Lewis, 144 N.L.R.B. 228, 236-37 (1963).
5 1 Lewis v. Pennington, supra note 47, at 78129. Prior to 1950 the union opposed
mechanization and consistently bargained for a three-day week. 381 U.S. at 660. The
advocation of the three-day week was one method of combating unemployment oc-
casioned by overproduction in the industry. Although a three-day week is a method
primarily aimed at maintaining as many jobs as possible, there is evidence that
this was not the overriding concern of the union even prior to 1950. Coexistent with
the aim of retaining jobs was an attempt to upgrade pay, security and benefits of
existing jobs. Hence, there was a union policy which, if successful, might lead to
acceptance of a reduction in the total number of jobs through institution of auto-
mation as a quid pro quo for upgrading. See id. at 698 and authorities cited therein
(Goldberg, J., concurring in part).
" Lewis v. Pennington, supra note 47, at 78135.
The district court change seemingly emanates from Allen Bradley. The analogy
is posed by the fact that the exemption would be vitiated upon a finding of union-
employer conspiracy, with the existence of a labor dispute being assumed by the
charge. Id. at 78131.
" Pennington v. UMW, 325 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 881 U.S. 657 (1965).
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divided Supreme Court, however, reversed and remanded on the
basis of a harmful error in the trial court's charge. The opinion of
the Court, written by Mr. Justice White, found the charge defective
insofar as it authorized a finding of conspiracy from the showing of a
union-management effort to persuade the Secretary of Labor to
apply a high minimum wage to suppliers of the T.V.A. term
market.5 4 Since concerted action to influence public officials even
as a part of a larger conspiratorial scheme cannot be the basis of an
antitrust violation, the Court held that the jury was misled as to
the sources of evidence which might be considered in finding the
needed conspiracy. 55
The Court did hold, however, that there were allegations of
agreement which, if proven, would cause the union to lose its
exemption.56 If it could be clearly shown that the union "agreed
with one set of employers, to impose a certain wage scale on other
bargaining units," the union would lose any claim to exemption in
spite of the fact that wages are a mandatory subject of bargain-
ing.57 The White opinion did not clearly indicate whether the
factual showing sufficient to vitiate the labor exemption would be
5 381 U.S. at 669-70.
55 Ibid. The Court relied on Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). In this case an association of railroads and a public
relations firm were charged with conspiring to restrain trade in and monopolize the
long-distance freight business. The firm conducted a publicity campaign against truck-
ers, part of which was aimed at maintaining and adopting legislation deleterious to the
trucking business. The Court noted that concerted attempts to influence legislation are
not within the prohibitions of the Sherman Act since any resulting restraint would arise
from government action. Id. at 135-36. It was further held that even if such concerted
influencing was done with a predatory purpose as part of a greater endeavor to bring
economic hardship upon competitors, it would still be exempt. The Court reasoned
that persons may by right seek self-interested legislation and, moreover, the govern-
ment is in need of the information received through the admittedly biased lobbying
conduit. Id. at 138-40. The court of appeals in Pennington was held to have misread
the Noerr opinion when it limited its application to lobbying not a part of a larger
conspiratorial scheme. 381 U.S. at 669-70.
" Mentioned but not principally relied upon was the alleged agreement that the
union would utilize the coal companies in which it held a controlling interest to
drive prices down in the T.V.A. spot market so as to force marginal operators out
of that market. Id. at 663. These allegations are also alluded to in the concurring
opinion written by Mr. Justice Douglas as evidence of a union-management conspiracy.
Id. at 674.
5 Id. at 665-66.
The National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 61 Stat. 142 (1947), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964), purports to delineate mandatory subjects of bargaining:
"For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the
mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours and other
terms and conditions of employment . ..."
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enough to establish a violation of the antitrust laws.58 Such a show-
ing for Mr. Justice Douglas, however, would be sufficient to constitute
prima facie evidence of an antitrust violation. The concurrence of
the three Justices who joined in the Douglas opinion was necessary
to elevate the White opinion to that of the Court.59 These Justices
subscribed to the White opinion by reading it as instructing the
trial court to charge the jury to find a violation of the antitrust
laws if the wage scale of the collective bargaining agreement "ex-
ceeded the financial ability of some operators to pay" and was
designed to drive these companies out of business. 60
The concurring Justices' concern with an actual violation of
the antitrust laws stands in contradistinction to the White opinion's
involvement with the status of the labor exemption from these
laws. Mr. Justice Douglas takes the position that proof of an indus-
try-wide collective bargaining agreement containing terms that could
not be met by some members of the industry is "prima facie evidence
of a violation" of the antitrust laws.61 Given a collective bargaining
';'After pointing out that the exemption would be forfeited upon a clear showing
that the union "agreed with one set of employers to impose a wage scale on other
bargaining units," the opinion of the Court states that "one group of employers may
not conspire to eliminate competitors from industry and the union is liable with the
employers if it becomes a party to the conspiracy." 381 U.S. at 665-66. (Emphasis
added.) The opinion subsequently asserts that such extra-unit bargaining unlawfully
limits the union's freedom and that this defect is present "without regard to preda-
tory intention ... " Id. at 668. Since predatory purpose is the crux of a conspiracy
it would seem that a distinction is being made between conspiring and extra-unit
bargaining.
" Justices Brennan and Warren joined in the majority opinion written by White.
Justices Black and Clark concurred in the Douglas opinion. Justices Goldberg,
Stewart, and Harlan concurred in the reversal in Pennington but dissented from
the opinion. See text accompanying notes 79-87 infra.
00 381 U.S. at 673. See id. at 670-73. This holding was viewed by Douglas as a
reaffirmation of the principles of Allen Bradley. Id. at 672. It is difficult to determine,
however, exactly what "principles" in Allen Bradley are being reaffirmed. Mr. Justice
Douglas cites language in Allen Bradley to the effect that "'[the Sherman Act] intended
to outlaw business monopolies. A business monopoly is no less such because a union
participates, and such participation is a violation of the ... Act.'" Id. at 674. This
would seem to imply that the action of the employer-defendants in Pennington,
without the union's participation, would have been in violation of the Sherman Act.
81381 U.S. at 673. (Emphasis added.)
Douglas reads the opinion of the Court as directing the trial judge that:
"First. On the new trial the jury should be instructed that if there were an
industry-wide collective bargaining agreement whereby employers and the union
agreed on a wage scale that exceeded the financial ability of some operators to pay
and that if it was made for the purpose of forcing some employers out of business,
the union as well as the employers who participated in the arrangement with the
union should be found to have violated the antitrust laws.
"Second. An industry-wide agreement containing those features is prima facie
evidence of a violation." 381 U.S. at 672-73.
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agreement of this nature, the question of exemption from the anti-
trust laws appears immaterial under the Douglas interpretation.
Rather, to avoid the strictures of the antitrust laws, the union must
refute the prima facie case established by proof of the collective
bargaining agreement and its effects.
JEWEL TEA: "There is no litmus paper test to determine
whether a particular bargaining provision is
within the labor exemption."
In Jewel Tea, a companion case to Pennington, 9,000 Chicago
retailers and seven unions were engaged in contract negotiations
covering virtually all butchers in the area. Jewel Tea was one of
several concerns that sought to relax restrictions contained in the
existing contract that prohibited the sale of meat after six o'clock
in the evening.6 2 The union rejected these proposals and threatened
to strike those concerns who failed to sign the agreement containing
the restrictions. Since Jewel Tea was the single holdout, it was
eventually forced to succumb to this pressure and sign the agree-
ment.63 Subsequently, Jewel Tea brought an action against the
The meaning of an "industry-wide agreement" is nowhere specified with pre-
cision. It could mean a collective bargaining agreement signed by all members of the
industry or one signed by the major members thereof. Further, it might connote
an agreement, other than a collective bargaining contract, between the union and
the major members of the industry to impose the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement on all members of the industry. A second question concerns the "features"
of an agreement which taint it with the onus of prima facie illegality. Presumably,
the allusion to "features" is referring back to the first section of the proffered charge
to the jury. If so, the "features" subsume only a high wage scale aimed at driving
competitors out of business. Arguably this is only one feature-an excessive wage
scale-having a "feature" of its own-an aim to drive competition out of business.
There are other features of the contract that might be relevant, such as the leasing
and "boycott" provisions. Yet no reference is made to them in the proffered charge.
See note 97 infra.
" There was a long history of union concern with the hours at which meat was
to be sold. As early as 1920 there was a collective bargaining agreement containing
the provision that "no customers will be served who come into the market after
6 P.M. and 9 P.M. on Saturdays and on days preceding holidays ...... 381 U.S. at 695.
Jewel Tea instituted a self-service meat operation in 1948, and during the 1957 bar.
gaining negotiations Jewel Tea broached the suggestion that the marketing restrictions
be relaxed so as not to apply to self-service vending of meat. Id. at 694-96.
The union maintained that where self-service night operations were in effect,
ostensibly without the use of butchers, customer service was still needed and these
butchering tasks were performed by non-butchers. Moreover, preparation for night
self-service operations increased the workload of the butchers during the day. Id.
at 696.
03 Jewel Tea's plea that the marketing restrictions were illegal fell on deaf ears. The
union rejected its plea and a counteroffer, and authorized a strike. Under this pres-
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union and the signatory retailers to invalidate the provisions of
the contract prohibiting the night sale of meat as violative of sec-
tions 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.6 4
The district court dismissed the complaint after a full trial of
the case, holding that the "record was devoid of any evidence to
support a finding of a conspiracy" to impose the prohibitions on
Jewel Tea. 5 The court further held that the union's action was
within the labor exemption since it concerned terms and condi-
tions of employment.66 Moreover, the district court ruled that
there could be no violation of the antitrust laws even if the union's
action was not exempt since it did not result in an unreasonable
restraint of trade.6 7  The court of appeals reversed, 8 ruling that
the contract provisions restricting operating hours interfered with
the exercise of a proprietary function and thereby constituted an
unreasonable restraint of trade.6 9 The Supreme Court reversed and
reinstated the judgment of the district court, but the majority was
unable to agree'on a common opinion.70
Mr. Justice White, writing for Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr.
Justice Brennan, noted that the issue on which certiorari was granted
was whether the limitations on the sale of meat constituted a labor
sure Jewel Tea ended its stand as the only remaining member of the industry not being
a signator of the contract. National Tea, a former dissenter, acceded to union demands
earlier. Id. at 680-81.
01 The action was brought in 1958 against seven local unions, the Associated Food
Retailers of Greater Chicago, Inc. (Associated), and Associated's Secretary-Treasurer.
Id. at 681. Renegotiations of the contract occurred in 1959 and 1961, with Jewel Tea's
signing preconditioned on reservation of the rights under this action. Id. at 694 n.7.
6"1Jewel Tea Co. v. Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 215 F. Supp. 839, 845
(E.D. Ill. 1963), rev'd sub nom. Jewel Tea Co. v. Associated Food Retailers, 331 F.2d
547 (7th Cir. 1964), rev'd sub nom. Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel
Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
n 215 F. Supp. at 846-48.
07 Id. at 848-49.
"Jewel Tea Co. v. Associated Food Retailers, 331 F.2d 547 (7th Cir. 1964), rev'd
sub nom. Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
0 331 F.2d at 549. The court proceeded to assert that from the evidence it was
clear that the union and the association of retailers, Associated, entered into a com-
bination which constituted a conspiracy. The court cited Interstate Circuit v. United
States, 306 U.S. 208, 227 (1939), indicating that the proscription of conscious parallelism
contained in that case was applicable in Jewel Tea in that each retailer knew or was
aware that all other members of the industry were being presented with the same
contract, and that the necessary effect of wholesale acceptance would be an un-
reasonable restraint on trade. Hence, the court of appeals ordered that operations
under the contract be enjoined and remanded with instructions that damages be as-
certained and awarded. Jewel Tea Co. v. Associated Food Retailers, supra note 68,
at 551.
70 381 U.S. at 697.
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dispute and therefore fell within the labor exemption and not
whether there had been a violation of the antitrust laws. 71 The opin-
ion asserted that the limitations were within the labor exemption
since the union's interest was so immediate and direct as to outweigh
the effect upon competition.72 The immediacy and directness of the
union's interest emanated from the fact that night self-service
operations would encroach on the butchers' workload and juris-
diction over their designated tasks.7 3 This encroachment was
deemed a question of fact for the trial court and its findings were
held not to be so clearly erroneous as to warrant reversal.
74
In dissent, Justices Douglas, Black and Clark argued that the
multi-employer collective bargaining agreement was not exempt
from the antitrust laws and that evidence of a prima facie violation
had been established.75 They viewed the principles of Allen Brad-
ley as dictating that the union's conduct was not immune since the
contract and the context in which it was negotiated showed that
the union was attempting to aid a non-labor group, retailers,76 by
71 The Supreme Court had limited certiorari to the question of whether the con-
tract was exempt absent a finding of conspiracy. 381 U.S. at 684 n.3. The White
opinion interpreted the opinion of the court of appeals as having found a violation
of the Sherman Act on the broad ground of concerted interference with a proprietary
function, id. at 690-91, thus making it unnecessary to disturb the district court's
finding that there was no conspiracy. Id. at 689.
72 "And, although the effect on competition is apparent and real, perhaps more so
than in the case of the wage agreement, the concern of union members is immediate
and direct. Weighing the respective interests involved, we think the national labor
policy expressed in the National Labor Relations Act places beyond the reach of the
Sherman Act union-employer agreements on when, as well as how long, employees
must work." Id. at 691.
73 "If it were true that self-service markets could actually operate without
butchers, at least for a few hours after 6 P.M., that no encroachment on butchers'
work would result and that the workload of butchers during normal working hours
would not be substantially increased, Jewel's position would have considerable merit.
For then the obvious restraint on the product market-the exclusion of self-service
stores from the evening market for meat-would stand alone, unmitigated and un-
justified by the vital interests of the union butchers which are relied upon in this
case. In such event the limitation imposed by the union might well be reduced
to nothing but an effort by the union to protect one group of employers from
competition by another, which is conduct that is not exempt from the Sherman
Act. Whether there would be a violation of §§ 1 and 2 would then depend on
whether the elements of a conspiracy in restraint of trade or an attempt to monopolize
had been proved." Id. at 692-93.
7 141d. at 694-97. Mr. Justice White's opinion stated that the court of appeals had
found it unnecessary to review the trial court's findings on the effect night marketing
would have on the butchers' workload or jurisdiction. Hence, there was no basis
for the Supreme Court to refute the court of appeals' interpretation of the factual
determinations made at the trial level. Id. at 683-84.
75 1d. at 736-37.
"Id. at 737. The member of the Associated Food Retailers were not self-service
[Vol. 1966: 191
LABOR LAW AND ANTITRUST
forcing Jewel Tea to give up the competitive advantage it had over
that group.7 Moreover, Mr. Justice Douglas challenged the factual
basis for the finding of immediacy and directness since there was
"indisputable evidence" indicating that self-service operations could
be carried on without encroaching on the workload or jurisdiction
of the union78
THE GOLDBERG VIEw: The Labor Exemption is
Coextensive with Mandatory Subjects of Bargaining
Mr. Justice Goldberg, writing for Justices Harlan and Stewart,
took a completely different approach to the problems raised by Pen-
nington and Jewel Tea30 He urged that collective bargaining
agreements concerning mandatory subjects of bargaining" be ex-
empt from antitrust litigation81 in order to preserve the institution
of collective bargaining in any meaningful form.82
Goldberg termed Pennington's requirement of unilateral ac-
tion unrealistic in light of the nature of the collective bargaining
process. An employer who desires to bargain in good faith should
inform the union that competitive conditions prevent it from
meeting the union's demands unless the competition is required
to meet similar demands. However, under the Pennington holding,
if such a statement by the employer were followed by union ac-
tivity aimed at "bringing the competition along," subsequent anti-
trust liability could result.8 3 Moreover, to determine whether the
union has "acted unilaterally," the courts under the Pennington ra-
ionale must investigate the terms of collective bargaining agreements.
If the inquiring court determines that the terms are economically or
markets. Therefore they employed more butchers than did Jewel Tea. By failing to
compete with the self-service markets their business might well decline and employ-
ment opportunities for butchers would consequently suffer. Thus, both the retailers
and the union had a joint interest in maintaining the share of the market served by the
former.
Another danger to the retail group was the possibility that marketers who took
advantage of Jewel Tea's night meat opportunities might become accustomed to doing
all their shopping at Jewel Tea. This market shift could likewise be detrimental to
both the unions and their alleged co-conspirators.77 Ibid.
78 Id. at 737-38.
70 Id. at 697 (dissenting from the opinion in Pennington but concurring in the re-
versal; concurring in the judgment in Jewel Tea).
80 See note 57 supra.
81381 U.S. at 731-32.
"OId. at 713-26.
831d. at 715-16.
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socially undesirable, it might well infer some sort of submerged
conspiracy behind the provisions.8 4 This to Goldberg was tanta-
mount to resurrecting the type of judicial control over national
labor policy that Congress abolished when it destroyed "government
by injunction."8 5
These Justices also found the White opinion in Jewel Tea faulty
for its encroachment upon mandatory subjects of bargaining by
vitiating the exemption accorded these areas through a deter-
mination of their importance to the worker.8 0  Like Pennington's
judicial intrusions into the collective bargaining process, this too
runs contrary to the national labor policy as expressed by Con-
gress.8 7
The Evidentiary Approaches
In light of the divergence of opinion in Pennington and Jewel
Tea, it is hazardous to state what variables they add to the body of
antitrust law. The practitioner, however, must advise his clients
in light of the existence of these opinions. In a field posing the
spectre of treble damages, it is essential to divine a minimal area
of agreement among a majority of the Court on how unions may
retain exemption from the antitrust laws. In this regard, it is
crucial to ascertain whether a majority of the Court ascribes to a
single evidentiary scheme. Vitiation of the exemption is greatly
dependent upon the type of evidence the Court will consider and
the probative effect it will accord this evidence.
The White view looks beyond the collective bargaining agree-
ment for evidence which will vitiate the labor exemption. Extra-
unit bargaining, the basic defect for which the exemption may be
84 1d. at 716-19.
5 FRANKFURTER & GREENE 1, 20, 142. Under the unilateral action requirement of
Pennington, when the trier of fact infers a conspiracy from the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement it undoubtedly has some standard in mind, the fulfillment
of which leads it to conclude that a conspiracy is extant. In the wage context of Pen.
nington, the trier of fact has, in essence, established a wage ceiling. An agreement that
exceeds this ceiling is susceptible of conspiratorial inferences. 381 U.S. at 718-19.
" Id. at 727-28. See text accompanying notes 72-73 supra.
87 Id. at 726-29. The White opinion in Jewel Tea was also refuted as taking an
unduly narrow view of the legitimate interests of labor unions in its holding that if
self-service operations could be run without impinging on the workload or jurisdic-
tion of the union or its members, no exemption from the antitrust laws would bc
applicable. Id. at 692. If, to protect the job security of union members, it were
necessary to aid the small retailers by imposing limitations on business hours, Mr.
Justice Goldberg would retain exemption for the union since their concern would be
job security, a mandatory subject of bargaining. Id. at 728.
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lost under the White rationale in Pennington, is not a fact that will
ordinarily appear on the face of the agreement.8  Nor can the im-
mediacy and directness of the union's interest be gleaned from
mere terms of the contract.8 9 Combined with this receptivity for
extrinsic evidence is a respect for the trial court's more proximate
assessment of this evidence, as indicated by White's acceptance of the
lower court decisions in both Pennington and Jewel Tea.90
On the other hand, Mr. Justice Douglas in Pennington could be
read as asserting that prima facie evidence of a violation can be estab-
lished from a collective bargaining agreement pernicious on its
face.91 Consideration must be paid, however, to language in the
Douglas opinion in Jewel Tea which indicates that he may not be
relying solely on the collective bargaining agreement for his evi-
88 "Unilaterally, and without agreement with any employer group to do so, a union
may adopt a uniform wage policy and work vigorously to implement it even though
it may suspect that some employers cannot effectively compete if they are required to
pay the wage scale demanded by the union. The union need not gear its wage
demands to wages which the weakest units in the industry can afford to pay. Such
union conduct is not alone sufficient evidence to maintain a union-employer con-
spiracy charge under the Sherman Act. There must be additional direct or indirect
evidence of the conspiracy. There was, of course, other evidence in this case, but we
indicate no opinion as to its sufficiency." 381 U.S. at 665 n.2. (Emphasis added.)
" To ascertain whether the union's interest in the provisions was immediate and
direct, the White group looked to the long history of union interest in Jewel Tea's
night service provision, note 62 supra, as well as to the manner in which the market-
ing of meat was carried on. 381 U.S. at 694-97.
00 In Pennington, the issue on appeal was whether there was evidence sufficient to
take the case to the jury and sustain its finding of an antitrust violation. The trial
judge had overruled the union's motion to dismiss and allowed the jury to rule on the
evidence. Lewis v. Pennington, 1961 Trade Cas. 78126 (E.D. Tenn.), afJ'd sub nom.
Pennington v. UMNW, 325 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). Al-
though the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, the White opinion found that
the allegations and supporting evidence were sufficient to vitiate the labor exemption
if the jury believed the evidence. White found that the fatal admission of evidence
regarding administrative lobbying without a proper cautionary charge so beclouded
the issue that one could not tell if the jury disbelieved the permissible evidence and
granted relief solely on the evidence that was presented under improper instructions.
381 U.S. at 669-70.
In Jewel Tea, the trial court failed to find either an Allen Bradley-type of con-
spiracy vitiating the union's exemption or a bargaining demand lacking in vital
self-interest. Jewel Tea Co. v. Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 215 F. Supp.
839, 845-49 (1963), rev'd sub nom. Jewel Tea Co. v. Associated Food Retailers, 331 F.2d
547 (7th Cir. 1964), rev'd sub nom. Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel
Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965). Such a ruling turned on the narrow factual question of
whether self-service marketing could be done without encroaching upon the union's
workload or jurisdiction. The White opinion held that a finding that encroachment
was unavoidable was not clearly erroneous. 381 U.S. at 694.
91 See Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the Antitrust Laws, 32
U. CHi. L. Rav. 659, 721 n.214 (1965). Meltzer indicates that the Douglas view con-
templated that a prima fade violation and not merely evidence thereof was estab-
lished from the face of the agreement.
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dence of a prima facie violation. He stated that "in the circum-
stances of this case the collective bargaining agreement itself ...
was evidence of a conspiracy, '92 and that "the district court failed
to give any weight to the collective bargaining agreement itself as
evidence of a conspiracy and to the context in which it was writ-
ten." 93 Hence, perhaps the agreement was not sufficient in and
of itself to dictate a finding of prima facie violation under the
Douglas rationale. If this interpretation is correct, there is a greater
proximity to the approaches of the White and Douglas opinions.
The evidentiary approach of the White and Douglas opinions
would be more easily reconcilable if their apparent differences in
Pennington could be dismissed as mere appearance. Douglas would
charge the jury to find a violation if there were an industry-wide
collective bargaining agreement containing a wage scale exceeding
the ability of some members of the industry to meet, and for the
purpose of driving these financially inferior members of the in-
dustry out of business.94 Yet the jury is also told that "an industry-
wide agreement containing these features is prima facie evidence
of a violation."95 The ambiguity of this statement lends itself
to two interpretations. The opinion may require an instruction to
the jury that a prima facie violation exists if there is extrinsic
evidence that the agreement was industry-wide and the wage scale of
the agreement exceeded the ability of some members of the industry
to pay. At the least, the statement may imply that a determination
of whether the agreement is industry-wide must be derived from the
contract itself. Under this latter view, the jury may presume a
violation and need only find that, viewing all relevant evidence, the
nature of the wage scale is excessive. 90 The facts in Pennington
seem to warrant the first view, since the collective bargaining agree-
ment was not industry-wide on its face.97 Rather, it was between
92 381 U.S. at 736.
0
3 Id. at 737. (Emphasis added.)
911d. at 672-73.
95Id. at 673. (Emphasis added.)
06 See note 61 supra.
97There were provisions of the BCWA and its amendments that affected the
marginal operators, such as the conditions prohibiting the signatories from leasing
land to or buying coal from substandard, nonsigning operators. These terms in and
of themselves do not impose the wage scale of the collective bargaining agreement
upon the marginal operators. They may be elements that would induce the operators
to sign the agreement, since they are often dependent on using major company land
for strip mining and the major coal companies themselves as the market for their
coal. However, the Douglas opinion does not seem to rely on these "features" of
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the major coal operators and the union,98 and extrinsic evidence
seems to be a requisite for proof of both industry-wideness and the
excessiveness of the wage scale.
Another factor which militates toward the conclusion that
Douglas' opinion in Pennington looked toward extrinsic evidence
as proof of a violation is the more obvious nature of the product
market restraint in Jewel Tea, combined with the less apparent
nature of labor's interest in the restraint. The inference that a
non-labor interest is being fostered by a union is seemingly derived
more readily from a collective bargaining provision limiting the
hours that a proprietor can sell his products than from a provision
requiring higher wages. 99 Yet the Jewel Tea opinion looks overtly
to surrounding circumstances and context to discern the motive
behind the hourly restrictions. 100
Under the Goldberg view, all latitude for the trier of fact is
narrowly circumscribed by making the scope of the labor exemp-
tion coextensive with the duty of labor and management to bargain
concerning mandatory subjects. 01' The problems posed by this
position focus upon the determination of what is a mandatory sub-
ject and who is to make this determination.
the contract as the basis for its reasoning that the agreement was industry-wide.
They are not included in the recommended charge to the jury. Douglas merely al-
ludes to them later in the opinion and seemingly accords them little significance in
the evidentiary context. See 381 U.S. at 674; note 91 supra.
Another explanation of what the Douglas opinion means by its assertion that "an
industry-wide collective bargaining agreement containing those features is prima
fade evidence of a violation," id. at 673, lies in the footnote to that statement, which
cites the conscious parallelism of Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 227
(1939). 381 U.S. at 673 n.*. This may indicate that Douglas would find a violation if,
when the major companies accepted the agreement, they knew or were aware (as op-
posed to having explicitly agreed) of a union attempt to get the marginal coal operators
to sign the same contract. Such scienter would include a cognizance of the fact that
if the marginal operators accepted the agreement they would necessarily be forced out
of business. Since the necessary consequence of their participation would restrain
interstate commerce, a finding of a preexisting illicit conspiracy is unnecessary under
Interstate Circuit. See ibid.
"According to the Court's description of the pattern of bargaining, see note 40
supra, it would appear that the BCWA is not a master contract signed by the union
and a national association of coal operators which purports to cover the whole industry
or even all of its members. Rather, regional bargaining seems to be the pattern, with
the association of northern Appalachia being the leader.
99 See Meltzer, supra note 91, at 715. Meltzer had proposed that only obvious re-
straints upon the market should be subject to antitrust litigation. This thesis was
rejected in Jewel Tea, a fact which the author notes in an appendage to his original
article. Ibid.
100 381 U.S. at 736-37.
101 See text accompanying notes 81-85 supra.
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The Goldberg opinion does not dissent from that portion of the
White opinion in Pennington which rejects the union's argument
that the NLRB has original jurisdiction of the dispute.102 Hence the
district court shall be the forum which will decide if a mandatory
subject of bargaining exists. However, it would appear to Goldberg
that in determining this issue the district court will be forced to
draw upon NLRB precedents, 103 which have been established with-
out regard to antitrust considerations.1°4
Thus, on the preliminary question of the union's exemption, a
court must determine that a mandatory subject of bargaining is
absent. 05 It would defeat the purpose of the Goldberg opinion if
10- 281 U.S. at 710 n.18. The White opinion in Jewel Tea listed several reasons
for rejecting the union's claim that the NLRB rather than the district courts had
primary jurisdiction. (1) The district courts are competent to ascertain mandatory
subjects of bargaining. (2) Referral to the Board would be fruitless in light of the
conspiratorial allegations in the complaint, since a Board determination that manda-
tory subjects were involved would not foreclose antitrust consideration. (3) To in-
voke the Board's jurisdiction, an unfair labor practice complaint must issue. In the
typical antitrust situation the plaintiff is a stranger to the bargaining and therefore
has no standing to complain to the NLRB regarding the unfair practice committed
during the bargaining. (4) Even if the situation were such that the plaintiff could com-
plain to the NLRB, it lies within the discretion of the Counsel General to determine
whether an unfair labor practice complaint will ultimately issue. Moreover, the six-
month statute of limitations for such complaints is too restrictive for antitrust pur-
poses. Id. at 686-87.
103 "[Dlecisions of the Labor Board as to what constitutes a subject of mandatory
bargaining are, of course, very significant in determination of the applicability of the
labor exemption." Id. at 710 n.18.
That Mr. Justice White would also look to NLR.B precedents to determine the force
of the union interest in the agreement is demonstrated by his language in Pennington.
"Unquestionably the Board's demarcation of the bounds of the duty to bargain has
great relevance to any consideration of the sweep of labor's antitrust immunity ....
381 U.S. at 665.
10, The "direct and overriding interests of unions in such subjects as wages, hours,
and other working conditions, which Congress has recognized in making them
subjects of mandatory bargaining," id. at 732-33, renders product market considera-
tions immaterial to Goldberg. Therefore, although the NLRB precedents inter-
preting the will of Congress were established without taking into account product
market considerations, they are an important source for ascertaining exemption from
the antitrust laws since they define the "central core" of the collective bargaining
process. The area subsumed by this definition is indispensable to a meaningful
exercise of the bargaining process and one that Congress has decided shall not be
affected by the application of the antitrust laws. Id. at 710. In essence, the Goldberg
opinion interweaves the "labor acts" and the antitrust laws in a manner which
subordinates the latter statutes to the former when mandatory subjects of bargain-
ing are involved.
105 Indeed, the Goldberg opinion may be maintaining that it was mandatory for
the coal operators and the union to bargain over the wages others would pay. One
commentator interprets the Goldberg opinion as insulating from antitrust strictures the
negotiations which are logically "intertwined" with the discussion of wages. See
Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments-1965, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 823, 833 (1965).
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the issue is treated as a factual rather than a legal question to be
decided by the court. Meaningful collective bargaining is sub-
verted if the trier of fact may disregard what is a mandatory subject
on its face and find conspiracy in restraint of trade.
However, a situation could arise in which a collective bargaining
agreement is concluded on mandatory subjects but where there is
also direct evidence of an unlawful conspiracy. Whether the Gold-
berg opinion insulates such an agreement merely because it per-
tains to mandatory subjects is questionable in light of his approval
of the holding in Allen Bradley.10  The opinion reads Allen Bradley
as condemning union participation in price fixing and market
allocation accomplished by joining a conspiracy of employers, 0 7
although the collective bargaining agreements in that case furthered
job security, 08 higher pay and expanded union jurisdiction. 0 9
Arguably, there were terms in the agreements which indicated that
the union was joining in an attempt to fix prices and allocate
markets. Nonetheless, Mr. Justice Goldberg merely characterized the
agreements as concerned with subjects in which the union had only
an indirect interest, without stating the reasons for such a cate-
gorization. Was it based upon a finding of nonmandatory subjects
in the agreement which partook of price fixing and market allo-
cation? Or, was the indirectness found in the presence of extrinsic
evidence of a conspiracy which so tainted the overt thrust of the
collective bargaining agreement that it appeared to be chiefly con-
cerned with price fixing and market allocation?"0 The most per-
suasive interpretation of Goldberg's approval of Allen Bradley is
that he viewed the decision as discerning the presence of price
fixing and market allocation provisions on the face of the agree-
ment and that this vitiated the labor exemption. Such an interpre-
100 381 U.S. at 706-07.
107 Ibid.
108 It is interesting to note that the Goldberg opinion in Jewel Tea stated that even
if the unions were attempting to aid the small retailers in competing with the chain
stores, this in itself would not cause them to lose their exemption since it could be
said that the union was seeking job security. Id. at 727-29.
100 See text accompanying note 24 supra.
10 To Goldberg, the existence of an illicit combination with non-labor groups can-
not be analytically separated from the question of whether the union was acting in
direct self-interest. This is demonstrated by his reading of Hutcheson: "a union acting
as a union, in the interests of its members, and not acting to fix prices or allocate
markets in aid of an employer conspiracy to accomplish these objects, with only
indirect union benefits, is not subject to challenge under the antitrust laws." 381 U.S.
at 710.
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tation is consistent with the major theme of the Goldberg opinion
-once the door is open to extrinsic evidence, judicial manipulations
can occur which may result in liability and thereby lead to stilted
collective bargaining.
CONCLUSION
Any attempt to collate the divergent opinions into a coherent
pattern is fraught with difficulty. Seemingly, the labor and anti-
trust laws have been interwoven in such a manner that it can be
stated, albeit with some trepidation, that a majority of the Court
subscribes to the position enunciated in Allen Bradley"' that a
union-management conspiracy will vitiate the exemption."12
Despite the Court's approbation of Allen Bradley, however,
there is a division as to the evidence which will fulfill the requisites
of that case when applied. This is most clearly shown by the
Douglas opinion in Jewel Tea, which focused the main thrust of
its dissent upon a finding of an Allen Bradley-type conspiracy, even
in face of the fact that certiorari had been limited to exclude this
issue. Although the facts of Pennington do not indicate as crude a
conspiracy as that involved in Allen Bradley,1 3 the three Justices
who joined the Douglas opinion gave nothing more than passing
attention to the labor exemption. Rather, they would instruct the
jury that evidence of a prima facie violation of the antitrust laws
may permissibly be gleaned from either the face of the collective
bargaining agreement 14 or from this source plus an undefined but
limited modicum of evidence as to the context of the negotiations." 5r
"'1 See text accompanying notes 26-31 supra.
'"The White group's adherence to this proposition appears to coexist with their
proscription of extra-unit bargaining. See note 58 supra. The Douglas opinion sub-
scribes to the conspiracy thesis. See text accompanying notes 59-61 supra. That the
Goldberg Justices purport to follow the holding of Allen Bradley in principle, see
text accompanying notes 106-10 supra.
Absent a conspiracy, the White Justices would vitiate the exemption if extra-unit
bargaining occurred. See text accompanying notes 56-58 supra. Where neither an Allen
Bradley conspiracy nor extra-unit bargaining is an issue, these Justices would still
not immunize a collective bargaining agreement containing provisions having an ad-
verse effect on competition in the product market if that effect outweighs the union's
legitimate interest in the provisions. This is the test used by the White Justices in
Jewel Tea. See text accompanying notes 71-72 supra. Although the Goldberg Justices
disagree with the application of this test when mandatory subjects of bargaining are
involved, see text accompanying notes 86-87 supra, they do not necessarily reject it
when such subjects are not in issue. See 381 U.S. at 732-33.
See text accompanying note 24 supra.
x" See text accompanying notes 61, 75-76 supra.
115 See text accompanying notes 91-93 supra. In Jewel Tea, the trial court noted
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Moreover, the three White Justices, by looking to the collective
bargaining agreement and the context of its effectuation, seemed to
consider the issue of exemption as arguable under the facts of
Pennington. By blending their extra-unit bargaining argument with
their conspiracy contentions, they were unclear as to whether some-
thing more than proof of the concerted action element of a section 1
violation is needed to foreclose the issue of exemption.:" 6 None-
theless, it is clear that both the White and Douglas Justices approve
of the use of the collective bargaining agreements and the negotia-
tions from which it was created to vitiate the exemption. 1 7
The Goldberg Justices seem to automatically exempt conduct
culminating in a collective bargaining agreement solely dealing with
mandatory subjects of bargaining." 8 This per se rule is diametrically
opposed by the rule of submitting multi-employer collective bar-
gaining agreements to jury consideration" 9 advocated by the Doug-
las Justices. 120 As evidenced by Jewel Tea, this makes the more
ambivalent White Justices the swing group. This fact is the prime
in support of its holding that "the record was devoid of any evidence to support a
finding of conspiracy:
"The record showed only that Bromann, on behalf of Associated . ..dealt with
the union at arm's length. At no time did he receive a direction to demand a 6 P.M.
dosing; nor did he make any such demand. On the contrary, Associated through
Bromann, joined in the all-employer offer of November 15, 1957, demanding the
elimination of the restriction on night marketing, and specifically requested that
change from the union representative at a subcommittee meeting.... This fluctuating
opposition by some employers to night operations because of their high cost is hardly
tantamount to a conspiracy with the unions." 215 F. Supp. at 845.
116 See text accompanying notes 56-58 supra.
11" See text accompanying notes 88-100 supra.
11 See text accompanying notes 105-10 supra.
110 By holding that evidence of a prima facie violation may be made out from the
collective bargaining agreement itself, Mr. Justice Douglas is not necessarily requiring
jury consideration since in theory the defendant may come forward with evidence so
persuasive that he not only rebuts the presumption against him but also earns a
right to a directed verdict. In practice, however, jury consideration would appear to
be guaranteed by giving this evidence a prima facie procedural effect. Moreover, this
opinion has been interpreted to mean that a prima facie violation is made out by
the proof required by it rather than mere evidence thereof. See Meltzer, supra note 91.
120 Mr. Justice Douglas does not assert that all multi-employer collective bargaining
agreements will be so susceptible of antitrust inferences that evidence of a prima
fade violation could be established from them. However, his imposition of antitrust
liability under the circumstances in Jewel Tea leads to the inference that no multi-
employer bargaining agreement is immune. This was the interpretation of the
Douglas opinion divined by Mr. Justice Goldberg. 381 U.S. at 726. They seem to
have interpreted the opposition to night operations by some employers as equivalent
to a conspiracy with the union. Such disagreement is bound to take place within
any large employer association when it bargains with the union. There cannot al-
ways be homogeneity on every issue. Therefore most of these collective bargaining
situations will present significant antitrust evidence under the Douglas position.
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source of the precariousness of the labor exemption, since this
latter group subscribes to all three methods of vitiation, as well
as to the use of circumstantial evidence to fulfill the criteria of these
methods. Moreover, their apparent reverence for the factual de-
terminations of the trial court 121 instructs the practitioner that the
trial level may be the decisive battleground.
The White opinion in Pennington transcends the mere place-
ment of the labor exemption in a precarious posture. In the pro-
cess, it intimates that a new theory of antitrust liability has been
created. In advocating that extra-unit bargaining may vitiate the
labor exemption, Mr. Justice White reasoned that such conduct suf-
fered from the basic defect of restraining the freedom of the union
"to act according to... [its] own choice and discretion."'122 If partici-
pation in extra-unit bargaining is liability-creating per se123 rather
than mere exemption-vitiating, the rule of reason has been dis-
carded, for the core of that rule is the tenet that not all arrange-
ments which in some manner impinge upon unencumbered dis-
cretion are unlawful. 24
c.d.a.
r.a.s.
221 See note 90 supra.
22 381 U.S. at 668.
121 See note 58 supra.
224 See Handler, supra note 105, at 836.
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